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Indiana University
Attempting to compare scientific theories requires a philosophical model of
meaning. Yet different scientific theories have at times—particularly in early
chemistry—pre-supposed disparate theories of meaning. When two theories of
meaning are incommensurable, we must say that the scientific theories that rely
upon them are meta-incommensurable. Meta-incommensurability is a more
profound sceptical threat to science since, unlike first-order incommensurability,
it implies complete incomparability.
Meta-Incommensurability between Theories of Meaning: Chemical Evidence1
The incommensurability of different theories is widely held to be a serious
obstacle to epistemic progress; belief in first-order incommensurability
between scientific theories is often characterized as a form of skepticism
that needs refuting. Theories of reference remain the best way to make
sense of what incommensurability really means for scientific knowledge
and, while they provide a useful philosophical tool for identifying incom-
mensurability, this approach brings to light a new problem. A type of meta-
incommensurability exists at that level—incommensurability between
different theories of meaning.
This is a potential problem for many sciences and a real one for chem-
istry since different chemical theories may demand wholly incompatible
theories of reference just to understand how each describes the world. If
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1. Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the Incommensurability 50 conference
at the National Taiwan University in June 2012 and at the Australasian Association of
Philosophy conference at the University of Wollongong in July 2012. I would like to thank
the audiences at these conferences (including Paul Hoyningen-Huene in particular) and
two anonymous referees for Perspectives on Science for their helpful feedback. I am also grateful
to Jordi Cat, William Newman, Kyle Stanford, Alex Levine, Noretta Koertge, and Robin
Hendry for enlightening discussions on and around this topic.
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no common theory of meaning can be found, those scientific theories must
be said to be second-order incommensurable.
This phenomenon is noteworthy for two reasons. Because recognition of
meta-incommensurability allows us to say a priori that two scientific theo-
ries are first-order incommensurable. And because this second-order incom-
mensurability is an even more profound epistemic problem since, unlike
standard incommensurability, it implies that the scientific theories in ques-
tion are completely incomparable at the first order.
1. Varieties of Incommensurability
Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend each claimed that rival scientific
claims are not perfectly comparable (Feyerabend 1962; Kuhn [1962]
1996). They borrowed the term “incommensurable” from mathematics,
where it means that two quantities have no common measure (e.g., irra-
tional numbers and rational ones).
The idea that scientific theories may be incommensurable was stated
most succinctly by Feyerabend:
[Two theories are incommensurable if] … the main concept of the
former … can neither be defined on the basis of the primitive
descriptive terms of the latter, nor related to them via a correct
empirical statement. (1962, p. 74)
The same notion was employed by Kuhn when he used the word
“incommensurable” to explain how scientists on either side of a revolution
could rationally disagree about the successes and failures of their compet-
ing positions:
… the proponents of competing paradigms will often disagree about
the list of problems that any candidate for paradigm must resolve.
Their standards or their definitions of science are not the same …
([1962] 1996, p. 148)
Within the new paradigm, old terms, concepts, and experiments
fall into new relationships one with the other. The inevitable
result is what we must call, though the term is not quite right, a
misunderstanding between the two competing schools … ([1962]
1996, p. 149)
Many people have interpreted these claims as a form of relativism
(Doppelt 1978; Siegel 1980; Sankey 2000). Kuhn, in particular, denied
these charges quite vigorously (Kuhn [1973] 1977, [1983] 2000), hence
it is worth noting that incommensurability of scientific theories does not
mean that they cannot be compared at all, any more than mathematical
362 Meta-Incommensurability
incommensurability does (D’Agostino 2014). Sometimes it is obvious that
the predictive power of one scientific theory is much better than another,
namely, when the phenomena to be described are clearly defined.
W.V.O. Quine made an analogous claim about the indeterminacy of
translation, asserting that multiple translations of a given sentence are
always possible:
[M]anuals for translating one language into another can be set up in
divergent ways, all compatible with the totality of speech
dispositions, yet incompatible with one another. In countless places
they will diverge in giving, as their respective translations of a
sentence of the one language, sentences of the other language which
stand to each other in no plausible sort of equivalence however loose.
(1960, p. 27)
The difficulty is not that the manuals are elusive; the problem is in
establishing that a purported manual is completely satisfactory.
It is extremely rare to see anything that looks like an explicit translation
manual between scientific theories. But Quine’s solution resembles the
actual practices of scientists far more than any translation manual could.
Quine suggests that we “need [a] background language to regress into. The
background language gives the query sense, if only relative sense; sense
relative in turn to it, this background language” (1969, p. 49). The back-
ground language need not be formal, the regress may be launched simply
by asking, ‘In what sense?’ of the term.
The concepts of incommensurability and indeterminacy of translation
do differ.2 Kuhn claims that a faithful translation is a fortiori impossible
because meaning cannot be fully preserved. Conversely, Quine denies that
there is any objectively true meaning “beyond what is to be gleaned from
overt behavior in observable circumstances” (Quine 1987, p. 5). This in-
determinacy is for Quine a choice between equally accurate translations,
since many sentences may be consistent with the gestures and utterances
to be translated.
What Quine suggests we step back into is another natural language,
spoken by all those trying to communicate. (This is natural for Quine,
since he believes that reference is tantamount to usage.) Any attempt to
overcome incommensurability through the creation of a translation manual
by comparing theories point by point assumes that the sentences to be
translated have a meaning that one may succeed or fail to fully communi-
cate. That is, attempts at commensuration of scientific theories amount to
2. I owe the following distinction to Sankey (1991a) and am grateful to an anonymous
reviewer for bringing this article to my attention.
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a version of Quine’s regress into a background language where the back-
ground language employed is a philosophical theory of meaning.3
This paper argues that one reason such an attempt to commensurate
theories in this way might fail is an inability to find an appropriate back-
ground language. Being aware that not all epistemic agents speak the same
language, it is unsurprising that there may not always be a common back-
ground language to regress into. Similarly, we should not suppose that re-
gress to a common theory of meaning will always be possible.
To appropriate Quine’s suggestion in order to evaluate the commensu-
rability of scientific theories, there is just one auxiliary assumption neces-
sary: When we treat scientists as epistemic agents, we must take their
statements to have meanings that are not accidental. That is to say, in order
to apply his maneuver to attempt a solution to incommensurability, we
must deny Quine’s deliberate conflation of meaning with reference and at-
tribute a semantic model of meaning to scientists. I shall argue that scien-
tists are sophisticated epistemic agents and, as such, we should not resort
to non-semantic models of denotation, which would be to give up on
meaningful understanding of any scientific theory not our own.
2. Direct Reference
In order to understand the problems involved with scientists trying to
communicate across theoretical divisions, we need to first have a theory
of just what is happening when each of them tries to communicate within
their paradigm, only then can we say whether or not communication can
succeed across significant barriers.
It is widely supposed that science deals with natural kinds as its stock-
in-trade. This assumption is well supported for the modern physical sci-
ences. Unlike certain theoretical abstractions, for a natural kind we admit
that, “the properties which distinguish it do not grow out of one another,
and cannot therefore be set forth in words, even by implication, otherwise
than by enumerating them all: and all are not known, nor are ever likely to
be so” (Mill [1872] 1974, bk 1, ch. VIII, § 4).
Hilary Putnam used the baptism of natural kinds as part of his theory of
meaning (Putnam 1973, 1975, [1970] 1975); he explains how lay
speakers’ connection to the natural kind is a causal one:
… we assign to the tokens of a name that I utter whatever referent
we assign to the tokens of the same name uttered by the person from
3. In most cases it has been a causal theory of reference (Kitcher 1978; Nola 1980;
Kitcher 1982; Kuhn [1982] 2000; Sankey 1990, 1991b; Lewowicz 2011). The cogency
of this approach has already been called into question for both causal and descriptive the-
ories of meaning (Bishop and Stich 1998); see below, §6.
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whom I acquired the name (so that the reference is transmitted from
speaker to speaker, starting from the speakers who were present at
the “naming ceremony,” even though no fixed description is
transmitted) … (1975, p. 246)
Linguistic “labor” is divided between experts and laypersons, where experts
do have an empirical method of identifying the natural kind.
Yet very few members of the linguistic community have direct causal
access to the kind, nor even epistemic access to the full concept:
Today it is obviously necessary for every speaker to be able to recognize
water (reliably under normal conditions), and probably every adult
speaker even knows the necessary and sufficient condition “water is
H2O”… (Putnam 1975, p. 228)… this does notmean that knowledge of
the fact that water is H2O is being imputed to the individual speaker
or even to society. Itmeans that (we say) the extension of the term “water” as
they (the speakers in question) use it is in factH2O. (Putnam 1975, p. 269)
So, while this is certainly a causal connection, for most speakers of the
language these are social causes only—reference borrowing.
It is important to note here that it is crucial that causal theories of ref-
erence use natural kind terms when describing the entities of scientific the-
ories. It might be suggested that a non-kind structure could be compatible
with Putnam’s criterion whereby an expert must be able to distinguish one
substance from other superficially similar ones. This is not what Putnam
had in mind, since his example of twin-water is clearly about two different
natural kinds. Moreover, Putnam also incorporates ostension and the causal
chain back to a baptism event as necessary components of the concept.
Since Putnam says explicitly that the “stereotype” of a kind used by lay
speakers is not the whole concept, the only way for the causal chain to
work is if lay speakers are referring to tokens of the type denoted by experts
(lay speakers’ intensions would not suffice).
In the 1770s and 1780s massive changes took place in French chemistry
making it the one period in the history of science when baptism of natural
kinds really happened. Up until the generation immediately preceding the
Chemical Revolution, chemists (particularly in France) had continued to
pay lip-service to the Aristotelian elements while building their systems
on more tangible chemical agents.
The Chemical Revolution axiomatized this expectation that the chemist
who identifies an element must have a causal relation to it, through lab-
oratory analysis. In the preface to his famous textbook, Lavoisier writes:
… if we apply the term elements or principles of bodies, to express our
idea of the last point that analysis is capable of reaching, then all the
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substances that we have not yet been able to decompose are for us
elements. ([1789] 1864, p. 7)4
With Lavoisier’s definition in place, a chemist who successfully
decomposes a substance previously believed to be simple will baptize
any new natural kinds. That is to say, reference can only be fixed a posteriori
by failing to decompose the substance further. Furthermore, the Chemical
Revolution was an era of renewal with respect to reference fixing; it was the
first time that causal access to elements was assumed. Lavoisier and Guyton’s
team coined natural kind terms and rebaptized known substances, using the
new systematic names for compounds and—more importantly—using the
names of elements to denote natural kinds.
The style of reference borrowing introduced was also quite Putnamian.
By communicating her findings with her peers, a chemist who succeeds in
decomposing a substance into new, simpler components forges a causal
chain that transforms the chemical community into a linguistic community
for the new natural kind.5 Thus, by giving an empirico-pragmatic definition
of an element together with a system of nomenclature, Lavoisier’s Elements of
Chemistry enabled all chemists to act as Putnamian experts:
… only a few adult speakers could distinguish water from liquids
which superficially resembled water. In case of doubt, other speakers
would rely on the judgement of these “expert” speakers. (Putnam
1975, p. 228)
Robin Hendry argues that Lavoisier was invoking a specifically Lockean
theory of denotation, wherein a minimal description must be given
alongside ostension (2005, 2010).6 The presence or absence of supplementary
4. All translations of Lavoisier are my own.
5. The social structures necessary for this Putnamian style of reference borrowing were
already in place well before the Chemical Revolution ensured that reference fixing applied
to natural kinds. Learned societies (e.g. the Royal Academy of Sciences of Paris and the
Royal Society of London) made reference borrowing quite efficient with their journals and
corresponding memberships. But this was not always the case: throughout the Middle Ages
most alchemical texts were written in a type of code based on mythological metaphors that
served to limit the size of the alchemical community to a few meritorious adepts, a tradition
continued by a few chemists as late as the 1660s (Newman 1996).
6. This is not implausible since it is well known that Lavoisier was influenced by the
abbé de Condillac, himself a devotee of Locke (Albury 1972; Bensaude-Vincent 2008) and
this does seem a fair characterization of Lavoisier’s aims early in his career when refuting
phlogiston theory. Indeed, even at the peak of his success Lavoisier says, “the idea must
depict the fact” (Guyton de Morveau et al. 1787, p. 13). Yet his aims at that point were
to create a language that would serve as an “analytic technique” and avoid giving false
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descriptions need not concern us here since two different natural-kind-
based theories of reference will normally be commensurable, i.e. the scientific
theories invoking these rather similar theories will be meta-commensurable
(see below, §5).
3. Descriptive Theories of Reference
Direct reference theories like Putnam’s are not the only approach to mean-
ing. Scientists denote the furniture of the world—they mean the things
they say—in different ways. The history of science bears this out and we
need different styles of reference to make sense of the diversity of styles of
human understanding.
The other major approach to understanding reference is the definite de-
scription model, favored by Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russell. It works
by parsing complex propositions into three more precise and transparent
ones, for example:
“The father of Charles II was executed” becomes
• There exists some x such that x was the father of Charles II
• This x was executed
• There is only one such x (Paraphrase of Russell 1905, p. 482)
Each of these claims can then be assessed separately for its truth or falsity.
The fact that it allows us to make sense of entities that we no longer
believe exist makes the definite description model of denotation particu-
larly useful in the history of science. By setting aside the fact that the sci-
entists of that period were mistaken when they asserted that entities such
as the luminiferous aether existed, the descriptivist model allows philoso-
phers and historians to appreciate the internal coherence of an antiquated
science. Definite descriptions are highly flexible in that they denote what-
ever fits the description, if anything. But the lack of rigid designators in
this approach makes definite descriptions antithetical to proper names and
natural kind terms. There is no need for a baptism moment (even meta-
phorically) as it is the semantic value of the description that does the
reference fixing.
impressions, that is to show how the new chemistry should use nomenclature to express the
relationship between compounds and their constituent parts. Nevertheless, Lavoisier’s shift
towards Greek names (e.g., “the matter of heat and of fire” became caloric under the new
nomenclature and, well before Lavoisier’s alliance with Guyton, “vital air” became oxygen)
suggests that he was relatively unconcerned with the transparency of the particular names
of simple substances by the later part of his career. Whatever the case may be, pinpointing
every aspect of Lavoisier’s practice is not necessary, since my thesis rests only on the claim
that by his generation chemists were using a natural-kind-based theory of reference.
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Furthermore, the evidence suggests that this was the theory of reference
used up until the early modern period, especially in chemistry. The defi-
nite description model works surprisingly well for certain chemical entities
that do not lend themselves to a natural kinds interpretation.
Aristotle’s four elements are in a sense defined by their characteristic
properties. He recognizes that this could lead to some confusion with
the everyday substances that go by the same names and explains what
he really means:
The simple bodies are indeed similar in nature to them, but not
identical with them [the elements]. Thus the simple body
corresponding to fire is fire-like, not fire; that which corresponds to
air is air-like; and so on with the rest of them. (1991, 330b22f )
The same goes for alchemy. Paracelsus famously developed a system
where chemical properties were reducible to a combination of three
principles—mercury, sulphur and salt; the principles of fluidity, inflamma-
bility and solidity respectively. Although the mercury principle was named
after the liquid metal, the principle is a theoretical abstraction. This prin-
ciple is often described as “sophic” mercury to distinguish it from ordinary
quicksilver; likewise sophic salt is not the same as the condiment and
sophic sulphur is something far less tangible than common brimstone.
Natural kinds are types, no more or less than the collection of all their
tokens. Conversely, principles are “ideal substances, real in the sense that
they existed in matter, but not real in the sense that they could be handled
and observed” (Boas 1958, p. 86). Because all these principles are more
like forms than like everyday materials, the definite description model just
works. If we take the claim “The sulphur principle is found plentifully in
metals,” we get:
• There exists an x such that x is the sulphur principle
• This same x is found plentifully in metals
• There is only one such x
This is a far more faithful reading of what these early-modern chemists
believed they were dealing with than any model involving natural kinds
could hope to provide.7
7. Imposing a Russellian order in this way can be very helpful, since mediaeval alchemy
is notoriously obscure. Indeed, it is unclear whether Paracelsus and his followers would say
that their principles were more like the substantial forms in Aristotle’s hylomorphic view or
more like an eidos in Plato’s transcendental realm. Traditionally, historians of chemistry have
supposed the former (Boas 1958, p. 86) but recently Ursula Klein has argued for the
latter (Klein and Lefèvre 2007); Klein’s interpretation is not uncontroversial, cf. Newman
2008. If the Platonic intention is correct, applying the Russellian model of denotation
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4. Changing Conception of Elements
It may be worth looking for translation manuals between those theories
that use the same theory of reference. The fact that most alchemists and
early-modern chemists continued to pay lip-service to Aristotle’s elements
while using chemical principles suggests that they believed their theories
to be compatible with Aristotelian natural philosophy. Paracelsus’ sophic
mercury, sulphur and salt are defined by the properties of fluidity, inflam-
mability and solidity in much the same way that Aristotle’s elements were
defined by their qualities. Hence it comes as no surprise that alchemical
theorists would try to show how these principles could be (theoretically)
reduced to the Aristotelian elements. It is not necessary to believe that any
commensuration schema would ultimately be successful in order to see
that this approach is a priori plausible for the theories in question. In
the case of competing systems of hypostatical principles we do need to
work through the steps to see if they are commensurable as scientific
theories because we cannot say a priori that they are not. They are com-
mensurable at the meta-level because they use the same theory of reference.
Lavoisier takes an ostensibly sympathetic tone in his “Reflections on
Phlogiston” when he says of G.E. Stahl’s phlogiston theory of combustion—
“Indeed, nothing was more natural than to say that combustible bodies
inflame because they contain an inflammable principle” (Lavoisier [1783]
1862, p. 624). But he is actually attacking Stahl’s antiquated theory of
reference—what Lavoisier really wants is for his audience to see phlogiston
as a concept just as hollow as the “dormitive virtue” that Molière famously
mocked for being true sui generis.8 If one were to interpret terms like “dormi-
tive virtue” through a causal theory of reference, both reference fixing and
reference borrowing would have to take place without a real act of ostension.
This would be next to useless since it would not aid scientists in gathering
information about the many other properties of the natural kind and further
empirical investigation would be necessary to show that a single natural kind
was responsible for the phenomenon in question.9 More to the point, while
we might admit that the term “dormitive virtue” can be taken to denote the
highlights a significant metaphysical difference between hypostatical principles and natural
kinds. The third point that comes out of a definite description is not all that interesting when
it says, “Charles II had only one father” or even “There is only one present King of France.” But
for chemical principles this does more work: instances of a chemical principle are, on this
reading, identical.
8. Molière’s The Imaginary Invalid suggests that Aristotelians fail to explain anything
when they ascribe opium’s ability to put people to sleep to its possessing a vertus dormitiva
(1673, troisième intermède).
9. Lavoisier applied the causal theory of reference to chemical entities that were given
more descriptive names earlier in his career, which turned out not to refer in the way the
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morphine contained in opium, that is not the meaning of the term. To use a
semantic theory of meaning in such as way would be a misuse.
5. Competing Theories of Meaning
Different theories of meaning can themselves be incommensurable. Since
scientific theories employing disparate theories of meaning have no com-
mon measure, they can never be first-order commensurable and are further-
more completely incomparable in meaning.
It might be objected that it is the goal of a theory of reference to ac-
count for the denotations of all rational agents. The theory of definite de-
scriptions and the causal theory are the two best established accounts of
meaning but we have seen that neither is quite comprehensive. In recent
years alternative theories of reference have been suggested that attempt to
incorporate the strengths of each of these disparate approaches in a single
theory (Sankey 1994, §2.6 “A Role for Descriptions”; Psillos 1999, ch.12;
Soames 2002). But this is beside the point: even if one were to believe that
a particular theory of reference were far and away superior to all others, this
superiority can only lie in such virtues of the theory as clarity and robust-
ness. One must not be tempted to say that a particularly unambiguous and
elegant theory of reference is the one correct model of meaning. We must
take a stronger intentional stance towards epistemic agents by admitting
that the meanings of their utterances may take different forms, for example
if a scientist’s metaphysical views lead her to describe substances in terms
of principles, a natural-kind-based theory is not the way to interpret the
meaning of her statements.
Let us suppose that Bertrand Russell extended his model of denotation to
substances as alchemists did. Russell’s statements about water made here on
Earth would have exactly the same extension as those made by Hilary Putnam.
On the other hand, if these two philosophers were to travel together to Twin
Earth, we would need to take their distinct theories of meaning into account
before we could say whether any of their statements are true or false. Because
Putnam means H2O when he says “water,” upon his arrival on Twin Earth
his utterances of “Water is H2O” would still be true, yet his observation
that “That is water” would be false (Putnam 1975, p. 223f ). Conversely,
when Russell says “water,” he means the colorless, tasteless liquid that fills oceans,
lakes and rivers (in varying degrees of purity). Thus all Russell’s statements that
name suggested. For example, oxygen was first conceived as the principle of acidity; now
we know that the natural kind baptized “oxygen” by Lavoisier is not the cause of acidity in
general (and the most general theory of acidity we currently have invokes pairs of electrons,
not any natural kind). For this reason Robin Hendry suggests that we describe such con-
cepts as “chemical syndromes” (2005, p. 34).
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include “This is water” are true, whereas if he were to muse that “All water is
H2O” while on Twin Earth, that would be false according to his meaning.
When we consider the descriptive theories of reference laid out by
Frege and Russell, we find that they are readily inter-translatable. Like-
wise, Putnam’s model is similar enough to Kripke’s for them to be often
conflated.10 Thus we can distinguish two “meaning paradigms”—definite
description and direct reference. Causal direct reference theories can only
make sense of scientific theories that employ natural kind terms.11 Even
highly technical and sophisticated versions are based on similar assump-
tions12 do not allow for denotation of transcendental forms and their par-
ticipants. Hence definite descriptions are how we should understand most
theoretical entities belonging to scientific theories that do not invoke nat-
ural kinds, especially when they are characterized as universal principles.
These theories of meaning are incommensurable because natural kind
terms (and proper names) are direct designators; these are fundamentally
different from definite descriptions—different kinds of concept, not merely
different in scope or degree. If one were to compare two purely extensional
theories of reference13, one might well try to commensurate their first-order
subsidiaries by comparing the entities in the world that they purport to de-
note. Yet all the theories that concern us here are semantic theories, theories
of meaning. One might attempt something similar by interpreting the mean-
ing of a common word, such as “water,” first with a natural-kind-based
theory by counting out all the tokens of H2O in the world, then with a
descriptive theory by noting the existence of all bodies sufficiently watery
to deserve the name. No matter how great an overlap one found with such
an approach, this would not be a way to commensurate these theories of mean-
ing, since in both cases one neglects the sense of the word.14 Furthermore, there
10. E.g. (Nola 1980; Read and Sharrock 2002); for the distinction, see (Putnam 1990;
Hacking 2007; Hendry 2010).
11. That is to say, when applied to the natural sciences. Certainly, Kripke’s model is
designed to work just as well for proper nouns and Ian Hacking has developed a theory of
“human kinds” for the social sciences (Hacking 1995).
12. E.g., the notion of partial denotation allows a single term to refer to multiple nat-
ural kinds (Field 1973; McLeish 2006).
As it happens, we do need this sort of maneuver to maintain a compatibility be-
tween Lavoisier’s pragmatic stance towards elements and treating them as natural kinds,
since many of those substances were later decomposed, e.g. the boracic radical was shown to
be a compound of boron and oxygen.
13. E.g., Mill [1872] 1974, bk 1, ch. II, §5, or more recently Quine 1987, p. 5.
14. Philip Kitcher’s model suggests that a context-sensitive theory of reference would
allow us to specify a set of entities such that each token of a term refers to one member of
the set (even when it is uncertain which member of the set is being indicated) (1978,
p. 527). But for this approach to make any sense, all members of that set must be the same
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is no way (apart from approximation) to find an equivalent between tokens
of a type and participants in a form.
Once we recognize this meta-incommensurability15, it becomes clear
that it is a priori impossible for a scientific theory relying upon definite
descriptions to be commensurable with one using natural kinds. This is
necessarily so, since the aim of both theories of reference is to provide
an account of sense or intension and they do so in fundamentally different
ways. The possibility that the extension of Lavoisier’s simple substance
sulphur might coincide with Paracelsus’ sulphur principle, for example, is
irrelevant to questions of meaning.
Like other forms of incommensurability, incommensurability between
theories of reference does not imply that these theories cannot be compared
at all. But, if theories of reference are our only means of cashing out the
true meaning of the scientific theories’ claims about the world (or at least
about certain entities, such as natural kinds), then second-order incom-
mensurability does imply a fortiori complete incomparability of those
scientific theories.
A major assumption of the present argument has been that scientists
know what they mean; this implies the possibility that different scientists
use (or in the past have used) different models of reference. This can be true
in two connected ways: The sorts of entities their scientific theories invoke
might be incompatible with a certain theory of meaning. Thus, simply by
using a particular scientific theory, the scientist commits herself to a par-
ticular theory of reference, whether wittingly or not.
Or, purely intensionally, a scientist would normally have definite ideas
about what would count as a real-world instance of one of her theoretical
entities. This may be incompatible with certain theories of meaning. The
reference-theoretical commitments of practicing scientists are rarely explicit,
so I do not mean to suggest that their scientific works contain fully fleshed-
out meta-theories of meaning. Scientists need not be part-time philosophers
but we might hope that a scientist, beyond merely using technical terms
correctly, could explicate the meanings of her claims by specifying what
they do and do not entail (through Socratic dialogue with a philosopher, if
kind of thing, e.g. persons or natural kinds. To throw disparate entities into the same disjunc-
tion (e.g., allowing that “mercury” could refer to common quicksilver or the hypostatical prin-
ciple of metallicity) might preserve the extension of a term across scientific revolutions but
such a solution would fail to preserve the sense of the word.
15. Although we do not use the term in the same way, I believe the phenomenon I
describe here is on the same level as the notion of meta-incommensurability that Eric
Oberheim and Paul Hoyningen-Huene have already described (see below, §6). My claims
here are parallel to and completely independent from theirs, so I do not shy away from
using the same word.
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necessary). Or, at the very least we should hope that a scientist could identify
an alternative theory of reference as not what she means when she talks
about the world.16
6. Scepticism and Progress
While meta-incommensurability is a greater epistemic threat than tradi-
tional first-order incommensurability, examining the relationship between
theories within a given model of reference can give us increased confidence
in the potential for diachronic commensurability.
Meta-incommensurability does not imply that theories of reference
cannot be compared; we can give reasons why invoking natural kinds is
a better way to undertake certain sciences than Platonic forms. In practice,
it could turn out that many modern scientific researchers cannot give even
minimally coherent explanations of what they mean when they use certain
natural kind terms. This would be a worry but not devastating for those
using a Putnamian causal theory, so long as they could point us to an
expert in their field who could. This would show that they are participating
in a linguistic community where these terms do have meaning. Perhaps the
worst case scenario would be if the originator of the new theory were the
only one who says something explicit about how these new terms mean
what they mean (rather than just providing a set of examples or a method
of verification). The history of science sometimes looks like this but plenty
of scientists are more than minimally reflective. They need not even have
come up with the theory of reference—we have seen how Lavoisier enabled
other chemists to create linguistic communities just by applying his defi-
nition of an “element” to their empirical discoveries—they just need to
believe, “This is what I mean by ‘element’.”17
Incommensurability between philosophical positions that happen to be
meta to scientific theories has already been noticed by Eric Oberheim and
Paul Hoyningen-Huene (1997). Their argument centers on the meta-
incommensurability that arises between realist and anti-realist philosophies
16. Most of them will not have thought through every aspect of their epistemic and
ontological commitments, so it would probably not be possible to determine whether each
particular scientist favours, for example, Putnam’s causal theory over Kripke’s. But it
should be straightforward to question a contemporary scientist and establish whether she
assumes a causal or descriptive theory of denotation. Likewise, if historians can find enough
primary source discussions (in prefaces and refutations of others’ work), a sensitive reading
can give us an insight into what earlier scientists’ commitments were.
17. The majority of the names on Lavoisier’s list of simple substances are very familiar,
far more so than in earlier chemical texts. The reason we still talk about oxygen today is not
simply because Lavoisier had the better first-order theory. The “staying power” of these
names is because a thoroughgoing reform of chemical nomenclature coincided with an
empirico-pragmatic definition of chemical element (Best forthcoming).
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of science. Although analogous, the concerns discussed here apply even if
both parties hold the same position with respect to realism.
Similarly, Michael Bishop and Stephen Stich (1998) have shown that
arguments invoking theories of reference to interpret scientific theories
cannot underwrite scientific realism nor can they prove the existence or
non-existence of theoretical entities.18 The present article considers similar
flights to reference with the far more modest goal of meaningfully commu-
nicating across theories. This argument does more than present a further
barrier to any who might overcome Bishop and Stich’s challenge. The con-
sequences here are more wide-ranging since this meta-incommensurability
of meaning is a sceptical threat even to those who eschew metaphysics.
This article has argued that to do justice to the sense of the terms of
scientific theories means utilizing the most apt theory of reference in each
case. It does not follow that different theories of reference commit the
epistemic agent to belief in the real existence of those theoretical entities,
unless she is already committed to scientific realism. Furthermore, this article
has not taken a position on the question of scientific realism. Descriptive
and direct theories of reference are each compatible with a range of realist
and instrumentalist interpretations19; it is the conjunction of a particular
theory of meaning with a scientific realist position that entails belief in a
specific ontology.
Nevertheless, to observe meta-incommensurability requires holding
disparate theories of meaning simultaneously, which may seem to be at
odds with scientific realism. Although pluralism about classification is
traditionally associated with antirealism, Anjan Chakravartty (2011) has
outlined a number of ways in which the scientific realist can be a taxo-
nomic pluralist.
7. Conclusion
Whenever two scientific theories assume disparate models of reference,
they are incommensurable at the meta level. This incommensurability of
18. They only demonstrate that this approach fails by showing that all such arguments
to date contain a lacuna; nevertheless, the authors suggest that a cogent form may well be
impossible – “since we have no idea how one would even begin to construct such an
argument, and as far as we know no one else has ever tried, we are inclined to be more
than a bit skeptical” (Bishop and Stich 1998, p. 40).
19. All except those particularly strong forms of scientific realism that specify both that
we must interpret scientific theories literally and that “the world has a definite and mind-
independent natural-kind structure” (Psillos 1999, p. xvii). These tenets together are
incompatible with descriptive theories of meaning. Nevertheless, if we take the semantic
stance to be more fundamental, we can simply strike out “natural-kind” from the meta-
physical stance and retain a rather strong realism. A structural realist approach (e.g.,
Worrall 1989; Chakravartty 2004; Ladyman 2011) would be even more amenable.
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meaning implies that they are also first-order incommensurable and
completely incomparable. As long as philosophers (or philosophically
inclined historians of science) can identify the theory of reference being
used—even tacitly—we can say whether or not one scientific theory is
commensurable with another at this meta-level. If they are using radically
different theories of reference, they are incommensurable at that level and
we need not go any further to ascertain whether they are first-order
commensurable.
Meta-incommensurability is a potential epistemic obstacle for many
sciences both historical and contemporary and a real problem for historians
of chemistry who wish to compare Aristotelian or early-modern principle-
based theories with later schools of chemistry that treat elements as natural
kinds. Although meta-incommensurability is a greater obstacle to scientific
knowledge than first-order incommensurability, the pluralism involved need
not lead to epistemic relativism nor a scepticism towards scientific progress,
since independent criteria can be given for the superiority of causal theories
of reference over descriptive theories.
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